My dissertation uses multivariate GARCH models to address several overlapping research questions. First, what effect does media coverage of the president and the economy have on the electorate’s evaluations of the president’s job performance?  Building upon this analysis, I then address the role political evaluations and media coverage play in determining the stability of consumer confidence.  I conclude by showing presidential approval has a significant effect on both the level and stability of the macroeconomy even when controlling for objective economic indicators and consumer sentiment.

We argue that when a nominee's opponents control the Supreme Court nomination process, they often delay it in the hope of uncovering a scandal.  If a scandal is discovered, they further delay the process in order to exploit the scandal and damage the nominee's prospects of confirmation. (Under review at the Journal of Politics)

As leaders search for support in key Congressional votes, the level of electoral safety that a legislator has is a good determinant of how likely they are to support the party. Using a two-stage least-squares panel data estimator with fixed effects and instrumental variables, we find that Senators and House members are punished electorally for as party unity increases and members of Congress strategically adjust their level of party unity according to their degree of electoral security. (Book chapter in completed manuscript)

Although much attention has been paid to the role economic conditions play in political evaluations, little attention has been devoted to the role politics plays in explaining changes in the macroeconomy. I argue that in order to fully explain changes in the macroeconomy, one needs to incorporate politics---specifically presidential approval, media coverage, and political events---in addition to variables typically employed by economists. (Under review at the American Political Science Review)

This paper introduces the Lydia system and its method of collecting and classifying entities, describes each phase of the process, and presents a practical application of the system for political scientists by examining the value of the Lydia system in predicting presidential approval.  I find media coverage of the president and economy affects not just how approval rises and falls but also how it expands and contracts. (In preparation for submission)

The level of consumer sentiment is affected by both economic conditions and political evaluations, but what factors affect sentiment volatility?  Furthermore, what are political consequences of instability in economic evaluations? (Data analysis)

I use a random coefficient model of individual justices' votes on the merits in labor cases to determine the extent to which economic conditions affect judicial decision making.  As economic conditions worsen, conservative justices vote more liberally, sacrificing their preferred policy in favor of more advantageous public policy. (Working paper)

What are the long- and short-term forces that explain partisan polarization within the American electorate? We look at several important cleavages within the electorate and how the various groups respond to different economic and political factors over time in evaluating the president. (Working paper)

We extend the analysis of advertising and election outcomes by exploring the effects of timing, tone, and exposure to negative television advertising on split-ticket voting in U.S. Senate and gubernatorial races.  We also model the factors that increase the number of attack ads aired in each campaign. (Working paper)

While there is general agreement that the LGBT community is more liberal than the general population, academic research has relied on samples that are small in size, non-representative, or exclusive to the LGBT community, effectively restricting the inferential power. Utilizing a nationally representative sample of 30,000 adults, including approximately 3,000 self-identified LGBT individuals, we explore whether a “sexual identity gap” is the result of differences in traditional political predictors or whether it persists after accounting for these variables. (Data collection and analysis)

Applying theories of cooperation to a variety of informal institutions including judicial review and prime minister selection, we explain why informal political institutions shape our behavior in ways that could be costly to individuals. (Working paper)